I. Introduction
Economists are increasingly aware of the importance of heterogeneity among individuals for issues in macroeconomics. One such issue is the interaction between individual income uncertainty and tax policy. Since an individual's personal tax liability is typically contingent on his or her income and since future income is uncertain, future taxes provide a form of insurance. This insurance effect of income taxes has normative implications regarding the desirability of the taxes (Varian 1980) and positive implications regarding their impact on con-sumption and saving (Chan 1983 ; Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes 1986). ' The purpose of this paper is to study the response of consumption to the timing of labor income taxes. We assume that individuals are infinitely lived so that the taxes do not redistribute across generations. We also assume that labor supply is inelastic so that the taxes are not distortionary. The failure of Ricardian equivalence in our model is fully attributable to the insurance effect of the income tax system. This failure of Ricardian equivalence, which was discussed by Barro (1974 Barro ( , p. 1115 ) and Tobin (1980, pp. 59-60), was first analyzed explicitly by Chan using a two-period model. Barsky et al. argued that this insurance effect is likely to be quantitatively important; they examined multiperiod examples but only through the use of computer simulations and under the assumption that income is independently distributed in each period. Here we allow individual income to follow a Markov process. Under the assumption that the utility function is exponential, we are able to examine analytically the response of consumption over time to various policy interventions.
After describing the model and its solution in Section II, we examine in Section III the impact of changes in the timing of income taxes. All the policy interventions satisfy an intertemporal government budget constraint. If contingent claims markets were complete or if utility were quadratic, one would obtain the Ricardian result that these interventions have no impact on consumption. We assume, however, that individuals face idiosyncratic income risk and that, since tax liabilities are contingent on individual income, changes in the timing of these liabilities change perceived risk. This change in risk interacts with the precautionary motive for saving (Leland 1968; Sandmo 1970; Dreze and Modigliani 1972) . As in Barsky et al., the implied behavior appears in some ways more Keynesian than Ricardian.
First, we examine a current tax cut, coupled with a tax increase in the future to repay the additional debt and accumulated interest. We show that the horizon over which the debt is repaid is crucial to the effect of the tax cut. Tax reschedulings over short periods of time have little impact on consumption, while tax reschedulings over long periods of time have a substantial impact.
Second, we consider the empirically plausible case in which a tax cut is coupled with a permanently higher level of debt. In this case, all future tax rates are raised just enough to service the debt. We obtain ' This insurance effect of the taxes also affects many other decisions, such as the accumulation of human capital (Eaton and Rosen 1980). partially Ricardian results. A $1.00 tax cut increases consumption, but by less than a $1.00 increment to wealth does. For reasonable parameter values, the marginal propensity to consume out of such a tax cut is about half the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth.
Third, we examine the impact of an announced future tax cut. We show that this announcement causes an immediate increase in the level of consumption, followed by further increases in consumption as the tax cut approaches. Hence, while news about future taxes has an immediate impact on consumption, anticipated changes in taxes are also associated with anticipated changes in consumption.
Fourth, we derive an index of fiscal stance, analogous to that suggested by Blanchard (1985) . The index implies that fiscal policy has similar effects on aggregate demand in precautionary saving models and finite-horizon models, even though the mechanisms are very different.
We share with much recent work the strategy of examining the implications of capital market imperfections without deriving the imperfections from the economic environment (see, e.g., Hubbard and Judd 1986; Scheinkman and Weiss 1986). A crucial assumption of our model is that individual human capital risk cannot be diversified. It would of course be better to derive this feature from the more primitive informational considerations of moral hazard and adverse selection. We hope that our model can provide a prelude to a more complete analysis of the interactions between precautionary saving and the timing of taxes.
II. The Model2
Consider an infinitely lived consumer who has additively timeseparable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility f 'e -Psu(ct ,)ds. The consumer is assumed to face a constant real interest rate, r, and stochastic income following a continuous-time 
This can be demonstrated as follows. First, the maximization on the right-hand side of (2) 
Thus a is the intercept of the "consumption function" in state i at time t, and r is the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. On substituting (3), (4), and (7) into (2) 
7 With the notation defined below, since ' has row sums that add to zero, it is a continuous-time Markov matrix and has all nonpositive eigenvalues. Thus, ' -ri has strictly negative eigenvalues, which proves by the implicit function theorem that (8) has a unique steady-state solution for the vector a given the vector y since with a set to zero, totally differentiating the steady-state version of (8) yields ry = (rI -W). 
To find the impact of income changes on aggregate consumption, we must know the distribution of consumers across income states. Under the assumption that there are many consumers in the economy facing independent Markov transitions but with the same transition matrix and that Markov transitions have been taking place for a long time, the distribution of consumers across states will be described by the stationary distribution Hl* corresponding to the transition matrix A. Using Ct, Wt, and Yt for per capita averages, (7) and (14) 
The quantity x is the ratio of marginal utilities between the highincome and low-income states (for a given value of nonhuman wealth) in the initial steady state. Its value can be determined from the following equation, which is derived by subtracting the steady-state version of (8) with i = 1 from the steady-state version of (8) 
Equation (19) is simple enough that it can readily be solved for x with the help of a pocket calculator. Given x, all other calculations we make can be done explicitly. To find per capita saving in the steady state, we can add together the steady-state versions of (8) 
The parameters 0 and 6 are between zero and one and depend on the dispersion in income (y1 -y2), the coefficient of absolute risk aversion -y, the interest rate r, and the transition probability p.9
III. The Timing of Taxes
We can now analyze the effects of a tax rescheduling. Some assumption must be made about the type of tax used. Any component of a tax that falls equally on both high-income and low-income consumers has no precautionary saving effect because it does not affect y + -Yt+s-Hence, Ricardian equivalence holds for lump-sum taxes.
We examine here the polar opposite case in which taxes are levied only on high-income individuals. Since at any time half of the population is composed of high-income individuals, a $1.00 per capita tax increase overall requires a $2.00 per capita tax increase on "the rich." Therefore, if T,+s is the overall per capita tax increase in period t + s and taxes fall entirely on the high-income individuals, then 
The parameters 0 and 6 have an important influence on the effects of various tax changes, as will become clear below. Equation (3 1) shows the precautionary saving effect of tax changes. A balanced-budget tax rescheduling has no immediate impact on the sum Wt + Ht of aggregate human and financial wealth. Thus the sole initial impact of a balanced-budget tax change is the precautionary saving effect r(t. 
The immediate precautionary saving effect on consumption, r(t, is the interesting effect. The other term in (32) involving lagged consumption changes-or, equivalently, lagged precautionary saving changes-is just what is necessary to ensure that consumers do not violate their budget constraints: if they consume $1.00 more in one year, they must consume $r less every year from then on to make up for it. The key insight is that the insurance effects of an income tax can induce consumers to consume more now without any immediate change in their aggregate resources Wt + Ht.
Policy Experiment 1: A Tax Cut with a Future Tax Increase
There are several interesting special cases. The simplest is a tax cut repaid k years later. If such a tax cut occurs in period 0, then
where D is the size of the initial tax cut and the initial addition to the national debt as a result of that tax cut. Equation (34) indicates that an income tax cut followed by a compensating income tax increase the next year has very little effect on consumption, but a tax cut followed by a tax increase many years later has a much larger effect. In other words, the interval between tax cut and tax increase ( The second parameter is p/r. Note that the transition probability p has the same units as the interest rate r; hence, p/r is a pure number. We allow pir to vary from 0.10 to 5.0. If' r is 2 percent per year, then p is varying from 0.2 percent per year to 10 percent per year. To judge the magnitude of p, note that over a 25-year horizon, the probability that an individual leaves the state in which he begins is 12 percent if p is 0.5 percent and is 63 percent if p is 4.0 percent. Tables 1, 2 , and 3 present the values of' 0, 8/r, and x for these parameter values. If' we assume for the moment that the debt and accumulated interest associated with a tax cut are pushed far enough into the future that e-ak can be ignored, equation (34) shows that the marginal propensity to consume out of' a tax cut is 0 times the marginal propensity to consume out of' wealth. Table 1 shows that the value of' 0 is usually in excess of' 11'2 and is often close to one. These numbers, together with equation (34), imply that the precautionary saving effect can be quite potent.
The numbers for 8/r in table 2 can be used to see how quickly e-ak lo The interest rate r can be viewed as fixing the time uLnit; all other rates are given relative to the interest rate. declines with k. For an interest rate r of 2 percent per year, a value for 8 of 4 percent per year is likely. For k = 25, e-8k is 0.37. Hence, for a tax liability pushed 25 years into the future, the marginal propensity to consume out of the tax cut is 0.630 times the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. Table 3 presents x, the ratio of marginal utility in the bad state and good state given equal nonhuman wealth in both states. These numbers suggest that marginal utility in the bad state is about two to five times marginal utility in the good state. This ratio is, of course, larger if the cross-sectional dispersion in income is larger, if individuals are more risk averse, or if the transition probability is smaller relative to the interest rate.
The amount of precautionary saving expressed as a fraction of average labor income, 2y(y' _ y2)r y + xis given in table 4. It is clear that the amount of precautionary saving can be substantial. It should be remembered, though, that in general 
In words, consumers act as if a permanent addition to government debt is at least partially net wealth, where the fraction that is treated as This index includes the effect of debt through nonhuman wealth Wt, the effect of taxes through human wealth Ht, and the effect of taxes through the precautionary saving term lt.
In the limiting case in which 0 = 1, the two indices of fiscal stance are almost identical. The marginal propensity to consume is q + p in Blanchard's index, while it is r in ours. More important, the discount rate for future taxes is r + q in Blanchard's index, while it is r + 6 in ours. In both cases, the discounting of tax liabilities at a rate higher than r is the reason for the failure of Ricardian equivalence.'3
Remember that the index in (39) 1 -2f) . A fraction 0' of future taxes is discounted at rate r + 8, while the remainder is discounted at rate r. The index thus readily handles any degree of progressivity.
IV. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed rigorously the role of the timing of taxes in a world in which taxes are contingent on individual income and individual income is subject to nondiversifiable idiosyncratic risk. Casual empiricism, as well as the more formal empirical work discussed by Barsky et al., suggests that the sort of heterogeneity examined here is substantial. Such heterogeneity among individuals has potentially important aggregate effects. Under reasonable auxiliary assumptions, these aggregate effects can be explicitly derived.
Previously authors analyzing the interaction between taxes and precautionary saving have typically relied on two-period examples. Our goal has been to extend the analysis to a more general and more realistic setting. The infinite-horizon model presented here is much richer in its implications, is more easily compared with standard dynamic models, and should prove a more useful guide for empirical work.
